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Abstract
In two-player games on graphs, the players move a token through a graph to produce an infinite path,
which determines the winner of the game. Such games are central in formal methods since they model
the interaction between a non-terminating system and its environment. In bidding games the players bid
for the right to move the token: in each round, the players simultaneously submit bids, and the higher
bidder moves the token and pays the other player. Bidding games are known to have a clean and elegant
mathematical structure that relies on the ability of the players to submit arbitrarily small bids. Many
applications, however, require a fixed granularity for the bids, which can represent, for example, the
monetary value expressed in cents. We study, for the first time, the combination of discrete-bidding
and infinite-duration games. Our most important result proves that these games form a large determined
subclass of concurrent games, where determinacy is the strong property that there always exists exactly
one player who can guarantee winning the game. In particular, we show that, in contrast to non-discrete
bidding games, the mechanism with which tied bids are resolved plays an important role in discrete-
bidding games. We study several natural tie-breaking mechanisms and show that, while some do not
admit determinacy, most natural mechanisms imply determinacy for every pair of initial budgets.
1 Introduction
Two-player infinite-duration games on graphs are a central class of games in formal verification [4] and have
deep connections to foundations of logic [36]. They are used to model the interaction between a system and
its environment, and the problem of synthesizing a correct system then reduces to finding a winning strategy
in a graph game [35]. A graph game proceeds by placing a token on a vertex in the graph, which the players
move throughout the graph to produce an infinite path (“play”) pi. The winner of the game is determined
according to pi.
Two ways to classify graph games are according to the type of objectives of the players, and according
to the mode of moving the token. For example, in reachability games, the objective of Player 1 is to reach a
designated vertex t, and the objective of Player 2 is to avoid t. An infinite play pi is winning for Player 1 iff
it visits t. The simplest mode of moving is turn based: the vertices are partitioned between the two players
and whenever the token reaches a vertex that is controlled by a player, he decides how to move the token.
In bidding games, in each turn, a bidding takes place to determine which player moves the token. Bid-
ding games were introduced in [25, 26], where the main focus was on a concrete bidding rule, called Rich-
man rule (named after David Richman), which is as follows: Each player has a budget, and before each
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move, the players simultaneously submit bids, where a bid is legal if it does not exceed the available budget.
The player who bids higher wins the bidding, pays the bid to other player, and moves the token.
Bidding games exhibit a clean and elegant theory. The central problem that was previously studied
concerned the existence of a necessary and sufficient threshold budget, which allows a player to achieve his
objective. Assuming the sum of budgets is 1, the threshold budget at a vertex v, denoted Thresh(v), is
such that if Player 1’s budget exceeds Thresh(v), he can win the game, and if Player 2’s budget exceeds
1− Thresh(v), he can win the game. Threshold budgets are known to exist in bidding reachability games
[25, 26], as well as infinite-duration bidding games with Richman bidding [7], poorman bidding [8], which
are similar to Richman bidding except that the winner of a bidding pays the “bank” rather than the other
player, and taxman bidding [10], which span the spectrum between Richman and poorman bidding. In
addition, bidding games exhibit a rich mathematical structure in the form of a connection with random-turn
based games, which are a special case of stochastic games [19] in which in each turn, the player who moves
is chosen according to a probability distribution. Random-turn based games have been extensively studied
since the seminal paper [34].
These theoretical properties of bidding games highly depend on the ability of the players to submit
arbitrarily small bids. Indeed, in poorman games, the bids tend to 0 as the game proceeds. Even in Richman
reachability games, when the budget of Player 1 at v is Thresh(v) + , a winning strategy bids so that the
budget always exceeds the threshold budget and, either the game is won or Player 1’s surplus, namely the
difference between his budget and the threshold budget, strictly increases. This strategy uses bids that are
exponentially smaller than .
For practical applications, however, allowing arbitrary granularity of bids is unreasonable. For example,
in formal methods, graph games are used to reason about multi-process systems, and bidding naturally mod-
els “scrip” systems, which use internal currency in order to prioritize processes. Car-control systems are one
example, where different components might send conflicting actions to the engine, e.g., the cruise control
component can send the action “accelerate” while the traffic-light recognizer can send “stop”. Bidding then
specifies the level of criticality of the actions, yet for this mechanism to be practical, the number of levels
of criticality (bids) must stay small. Bidding games can be used in settings in which bids represent the
monetary value of choosing an action. Such settings typically have a finite granularity, e.g., cents. One such
setting is Blockchain technology [15, 5], where players represent agents that are using the service, and their
bids represent transaction fees to the miners. A second such setting is reasoning about ongoing auctions like
the ones used in the internet for advertisement allocation [32]. Bidding games can be used to devise bidding
strategies in such auctions. Motivation for bidding games also comes from recreational games, e.g., bidding
chess [12] or tic-tac-toe1, where it is unreasonable for a human player to keep track of arbitrarily small and
possibly irrational numbers.
In this work, we study discrete-bidding games in which the granularity of the bids is restricted to be
natural numbers. A key difference from the continuous-bidding model is that there, the issue of how to break
ties was largely ignored, by only considering cases where the initial budget does not equal Thresh(v). In
discrete-bidding, however, ties are a central part of the game. A discrete-bidding game is characterized
explicitly by a tie-breaking mechanism in addition to the standard components, i.e., an arena, the players’
budgets, and an objective. We investigate several tie-breaking mechanisms and show how they affect the
properties of the game. Discrete-bidding games with reachability objectives were first studied in [20]. The
focus in that paper was on extending the Richman theory to the discrete domain, and we elaborate on their
results later in this section.
A central concept in game theory is a winning strategy: a strategy that a player can reveal before the
other player, and still win the game. A game is determined if exactly one of the players can guarantee
winning the game. The simplest example of a non-determined game is a two-player game called matching
1http://biddingttt.herokuapp.com/
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Figure 1: A bidding game that is not determined with alternating tie-breaking, when the initial configuration
is 〈v0, 1, 1∗〉.
pennies: Each player chooses 1 (“heads”) or 0 (“tails”), and Player 1 wins iff the parity of the sum of the
players’ choices is 0. Matching pennies is not determined since if Player 1 reveals his choice first, Player 2
will choose opposite and win the game, and dually for Player 2.
Discrete-bidding games are a subclass of concurrent graph games [2], in which in each turn, the players
simultaneously select actions, and the joint vector of actions determines the next position. A bidding game
G is equivalent to a concurrent game G′ that is played on the “configuration graph” of G: each vertex of G′ is
a tuple 〈v,B1, B2, s〉, where v is the vertex in G on which the token is situated, the players’ budgets are B1
andB2, and s is the state of the tie-breaking mechanism. An action in G′ corresponds to a bid and a vertex to
move to upon winning the bidding. Concurrent games are not in general determined since matching pennies
can be modelled as a concurrent game.
The central question we address in this work asks under which conditions bidding games are determined.
We show that determinacy in bidding games highly depends on the tie-breaking mechanism under use. We
study natural tie-breaking mechanisms, show that some admit determinacy while others do not. The simplest
tie-breaking rule we consider alternates between the players: Player 1 starts with the advantage, when a tie
occurs, the player with the advantage wins, and the advantage switches to the other player. We show that
discrete-bidding games with alternating tie-breaking are not determined, as we demonstrate below.
Example 1. Consider the bidding reachability game that is depicted in Fig. 1. We depict the player who
has the advantage with a star. We claim that no player has a winning strategy when the game starts from
the configuration 〈v0, 1, 1∗〉, thus the token is placed on v0, both budgets equal 1, and Player 2 has the tie-
breaking advantage. We start by showing that if Player 2 reveals his first bid before Player 1, then Player 1
can guarantee winning the game. There are two cases. First, if Player 2 bids 0, Player 1 bids 1 and draws
the game to t. Second, if Player 2 bids 1, then Player 1 bids 0, and the game reaches the configuration
〈v1, 2, 0∗〉. Next, both players bid 0 and we reach 〈v2, 2∗, 0〉. Player 1 wins by bidding 1 twice; indeed, the
next two configurations are 〈v0, 1∗, 1〉 and either 〈t, 0, 2∗〉, if Player 2 bids 1, or 〈t, 0∗, 2〉, if he bids 0. The
proof that Player 1 loses when he reveals his first bid before Player 2 can be found in Theorem 10.
We generalize the alternating tie-breaking mechanism as follows. A transducer is similar to an automa-
ton only that the states are labeled by output letters. In transducer-based tie breaking, a transducer is run
in parallel to the game. The transducer reads information regarding the biddings and outputs which player
wins in case of a tie. Alternating tie-breaking is a special case of transducer tie-breaking in which the trans-
ducer is a two-state transducer, where the alphabet consists of the letters > (“tie”) and ⊥ (“no-tie”) and the
transducer changes its state only when the first letter is read.
Example 2. We describe another simpler game that is not determined. In a Büchi game, Player 1 wins a
play iff it visits an accepting state infinitely often. We claim that the Büchi bidding game that is depicted on
the left of Fig. 2 is not determined when the tie-breaking uses the transducer on the right of the figure and
both of the players’ initial budgets are positive. That is, if a tie occurs in the first bidding, Player 2 wins all
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ties for the rest of the game, and otherwise Player 1 wins all ties. First note that, for i ∈ {1, 2}, no matter
what the budgets are, if Player i wins all ties, he wins the game. A winning strategy for Player i always bids
0. Intuitively, the other player must invest a unit of budget for winning a bidding and leaving vi, thus the
game eventually stays in vi. So, the winner is determined according to the outcome of the first bidding, and
the players essentially play a matching-pennies game in that round.
v1 v2
1 21
s1 s0 s2
⊤,⊥ ⊤,⊥
⊤⊥
Figure 2: On top, a Büchi game that is not determined when tie-breaking is determined according to the
transducer on the bottom, where the letters > and ⊥ respectively represent “tie” and “no tie”.
We proceed to describe our positive results. For transducer-based tie-breaking, we identify a necessary
and sufficient condition for determinacy: when the transducer is un-aware of the occurrence of ties, bidding
games are determined. The second tie-breaking mechanism for which we show determinacy is random tie-
breaking: a tie is resolved by tossing a coin that determines the winner of the bidding. Finally, a tie-breaking
mechanism that was introduced in [20] is advantage based, except that when a tie occurs, the player with the
advantage can choose between (1) winning the bidding and passing the advantage to the other player, or (2)
allowing the other player to win the bidding and keeping the advantage. Determinacy for reachability games
with this tie-breaking mechanism was shown in [20]. The technique that is used there cannot be extended to
the other tie-breaking mechanisms we study. We show an alternative proof for advantage-based tie-breaking
and extend the determinacy result for richer objectives beyond reachability.
We obtain our positive results by developing a unified proof technique to reason about bidding games,
which we call local determinacy. Intuitively, a concurrent game is locally determined if from each vertex,
there is a player who can reveal his action before the other player. We show that locally-determined reacha-
bility games are determined and then extend to Müller games, which are richer qualitative games. We expect
our technique to extend to show determinacy in other fragments of concurrent games unlike the technique
in [20], which is tailored for bidding games.
Determinacy has computational complexity implications; namely, finding the winner in a bidding game
with objective α when the budgets are given in unary is as hard as solving a turn-based game with objective
α, and we show a simple reduction in the other way for bidding games. Finally, we establish results for
strongly-connected discrete-bidding games.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Concurrent and turn-based games
A concurrent game is a two-player game that is played by placing a token on a graph. In each turn, both
players simultaneously select actions, and the next vertex the token moves to is determined according to
their choices. The players thus produce an infinite path pi in the graph. A game is accompanied by an
objective for Player 1, who wins iff pi meets his objective. We specify standard objectives in games later in
the section. For i ∈ {1, 2}, we use −i to refer to the other player, namely −i = 3− i
Formally, a concurrent game is played on an arena 〈A, V, λ, δ〉, where A is a finite set of actions, V is
a finite set of vertices, the function λ : V × {1, 2} → 2A \ ∅ specifies the allowed actions for Player i in
vertex v, and δ : V × A × A → V specifies, given the current vertex and a choice of actions for the two
players, the next vertex the token moves to. We call u ∈ V a neighbor of v ∈ V if there is a1, a2 ∈ A
with u = δ(v, a1, a2). We say that Player i controls a vertex v ∈ V if his actions uniquely determine where
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the token proceeds to from v. That is, for every a ∈ λ(v, i) there is a vertex u such that, for every allowed
action a′ of Player −i, we have δ(v, a, a′) = u. A turn-based game is a special case of a concurrent game in
which each vertex is controlled by one of the players.
2.2 Bidding games
A (discrete) bidding game is a special case of a concurrent game. The game is played on a graph and both
players have budgets. In each turn, a bidding takes place to determine which player gets to move the token.
Formally, a bidding game is played on an arena 〈V,E,N,M〉, where V is a set of vertices, E ⊆ (V × V )
is a set of edges, N ∈ IN represents the total budget, and the tie-breaking mechanism isM on which we
elaborate below.
We formalize the semantics of a bidding game 〈V,E,N,M〉 by means of a concurrent game 〈A, V ′, λ, δ〉.
Let B1, B2 ∈ {0, . . . , N} with B1 +B2 = N and v ∈ V . A configuration vertex of the form 〈v,B1, B2, s〉,
represents a configuration of the bidding game in which the token is placed on v, Player 1’s budget is B1,
Player 2’s budget is B2, and s represents the state of the tie-breaking mechanism. The allowed actions
in a configuration vertex 〈v,B1, B2, s〉 are {0, . . . , B1} for Player 1 and {0, . . . , B2} for Player 2. For
bids b1, b2 ∈ {0, . . . , N}, the neighbor of a configuration vertex c = 〈v,B1, B2, s〉 is an intermediate
vertex 〈c, b1, b2〉. If b1 > b2, then Player 1 wins the bidding and chooses the next vertex the token pro-
ceeds to. In this case, Player 1 controls 〈c, b1, b2〉 and its neighbors are configuration vertices of the form
〈v′, B1 − b1, B2 + b1, s′〉, where v′ ∈ V with 〈v, v′〉 ∈ E and s′ is the updated tie-breaking state. The case
where Player 2 wins the bidding, i.e., b1 < b2, is dual.
We proceed to the case of ties and describe three types of tie-breaking mechanisms.
• Transducer-based: A transducer is T = 〈Σ, Q, q0,∆,Γ〉, where Σ is a set of letters, Q is a set
of states, q0 ∈ Q is an initial state, ∆ : Q × Σ → Q is a deterministic transition function, and
Γ : Q → {1, 2} is a labeling of the states. Intuitively, T is run in parallel to the bidding game and
its state is updated according to the outcomes of the biddings. Whenever a tie occurs and T is in
state s ∈ Q, the winner of the bidding is Γ(s). The information according to which tie-breaking is
determined is represented by the alphabet of T . In general, the information can include the vertex on
which the token is located and the result of the previous bidding, i.e., the winner, whether or not a tie
occurred, and the winning bid, thus Σ = V × {1, 2} × {⊥,>} × IN.
• Random-based: A tie is resolved by choosing the winner uniformly at random.
• Advantage-based: Exactly one player holds the advantage. Suppose Player i holds the advantage
and a tie occurs. Then Player i chooses who wins the bidding. If he calls the other player the winner,
Player i keeps the advantage, and if he calls himself the winner, the advantage switches to the other
player.
Formally, consider a configuration c = 〈v,B1, B2, s〉 and an intermediate vertex 〈c, b1, b2〉. In the
transducer-based mechanism, the state s is a state in the transducer T . If b1 6= b2, the player who controls
〈v, b1, b2〉 is determined as in the above. In case b1 = b2, then Player Γ(s) controls the vertex. In both
cases, we update the state of the tie-breaking mechanism by feeding it the information on the last bidding;
who won, whether a tie occurred, and what vertex the winner chose, thus we set s′ = ∆(s, σ), where
σ = 〈v′, i,⊥, bi〉 in case Player i wins the bidding with his bid of bi, moves to v′, and no tie occurs. The
other cases are similar.
In random-based tie-breaking, the mechanism has no state, thus we can completely omit s. Consider
an intermediate vertex 〈c, b1, b2〉. The case of b1 6= b2 is as in the above. Suppose both players bid b. The
intermediate vertex 〈c, b, b〉 is controlled by “Nature”. It has two probabilistic outgoing transitions; one
transition leads to the intermediate vertex 〈c, b, b− 1〉, which represents Player 1 winning the bidding with a
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bid of b, and the other to the intermediate vertex 〈c, b− 1, b〉, which represents Player 2 winning the bidding
with a bid of b. We elaborate on the semantics of concurrent games with probabilistic edges in Section 5.
Finally, in advantage-based tie-breaking, the state of the mechanism represents which player has the
advantage, thus s ∈ {1, 2}. Consider an intermediate vertex 〈c, b1, b2〉. When a tie does not occur, there
is no need to update s. When b1 = b2, then Player s controls 〈c, b1, b2〉 and the possibility to choose who
wins the bidding. Choosing to lose the bidding is modelled by no update to s and moving to an intermediate
vertex that is controlled by Player−s from which he chooses a successor vertex and the budgets are updated
accordingly. When Player s chooses to win the bidding we proceed directly to the next configuration vertex,
update the budgets, and the mechanism’s state to 3− s.
2.3 Strategies, plays, and objectives
A strategy is, intuitively, a recipe that dictates the actions that a player chooses in a game. Formally, a finite
history of a concurrent game is a sequence 〈v0, a10, a20〉, . . . , 〈vn−1, a1n−1, a2n−1〉, vn ∈ (V × A × A)∗ · V
such that, for each 0 ≤ i < n, we have vi+1 = δ(vi, a1i , a2i ). A strategy is a function from (V ×A×A)∗ ·V
to A. We restrict attention to legal strategies that assign only allowed actions, thus for every history pi ∈
(V × A × A)∗ · V that ends in v ∈ V , a legal strategy σi for Player i has σi(pi) ∈ λ(v, i). Two strategies
σ1 and σ2 for the two players and an initial vertex v0, determine a unique play, denoted play(v0, σ1, σ2) ∈
(V ×A×A)ω, which is defined as follows. The first element of play(v0, σ1, σ2) is 〈v0, σ1(v0), σ2(v0)〉. For
i ≥ 1, let pii denote the prefix of length i of play(v0, σ1, σ2) and suppose its last element is 〈vi, a1i , a2i 〉. We
define vi+1 = δ(vi, ai1, a
i
2), a
i+1
1 = σ1(pi
i · vi+1), and ai+12 = σ2(pii · vi+1). The path that corresponds to
play(v0, σ1, σ2) is v0, v1, . . ..
An objective for Player 1 is a subset on infinite paths α ⊆ V ω. We say that Player 1 wins play(v0, σ1, σ2)
iff the path pi that corresponds to play(v0, σ1, σ2) satisfies the objective, i.e., pi ∈ α. Let inf(pi) ⊆ V be the
subset of vertices that pi visits infinitely often. We consider the following objectives.
• Reachability A game is equipped with a target set T ⊆ V . A play pi is winning for Player 1, the
reachability player, iff it visits T .
• Büchi A game is equipped with a set T ⊆ V of accepting vertices. A play pi is winning for Player 1
iff it visits T infinitely often.
• Parity A game is equipped with a function p : V → {1, . . . , d}, for d ∈ IN. A play pi is winning for
Player 1 iff maxv∈inf(pi) p(v) is odd.
• Müller A game is equipped with a set T ⊆ 2V . A play pi is winning for Player 1 iff inf(pi) ∈ T .
3 A Framework for Proving Determinacy
3.1 Determinacy
Determinacy is a strong property of games, which intuitively says that exactly one player has a winning
strategy. That is, the winner can reveal his strategy before the other player, and the loser, knowing how the
winner plays, still loses. Formally, a strategy σi is a winning strategy for Player i at vertex v iff for every
strategy σ−i for Player −i, Player i wins play(v, σ1, σ2). We say that a game 〈V,E, α〉 is determined if from
every vertex v ∈ V either Player 1 has a winning strategy from v or Player 2 has a winning strategy from v.
While concurrent games are not determined (e.g., “matching pennies”), turn-based games are largely
determined.
Theorem 3. [28] Turn-based games with objectives that are Borel sets are determined. In particular, turn-
based Müller games are determined.
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We describe an alternative definition for determinacy in concurrent games. Consider a concurrent game
G = 〈A, V, λ, δ, α〉. Recall that in G, in each turn, the players simultaneously select an action, and their
joint actions determine where the token moves to. For i ∈ {1, 2}, let Gi be the turn-based game that,
assuming the token is placed on a vertex v, Player i selects an action first, then Player −i selects an action,
and the token proceeds from v as in G given the two actions. Formally, the game G1 is a turn-based game
〈A, V ∪ (V × A), λ′, δ′, α′〉, and the definition for G2 is dual. The vertices that are controlled by Player 1
are V1 = V and V2 = V × A. For v ∈ V , we have λ′(v, 1) = λ(v, 1) and since Player 1 controls
v, we arbitrarily fix λ′(v, 2) = A. For a1 ∈ λ(v, 1) and a2 ∈ A, we define δ(v, a1, a2) = 〈v, a1〉.
Similarly, we define λ′(〈v, a1〉, 1) = A and λ′(〈v, a1〉, 2) = λ(v, 2). For a′1 ∈ A and a2 ∈ λ(v, 2), we
define δ′(〈v, a1〉, a′1, a2) = δ(v, a1, a2). Finally, an infinite play v1, 〈v1, a1〉, v2, 〈v2, a2〉, . . . , is in α′ iff
v1, v2, . . . is in α. Recall that in bidding games, intermediate vertices are controlled by one player and the
only concurrent moves occur when revealing bids. Thus, when G is a bidding game, in Gi, Player i always
reveals his bids before Player −i.
Proposition 4. A strategy σi is winning for Player i in G at vertex v iff it is winning in Gi from v. Then, G
is determined at v iff either Player 1 wins in G1 from v or Player 2 wins in G2 from v.
3.2 Local and global determinacy
We define local determinacy in a fragment of concurrent games, which slightly generalizes bidding games.
Consider a transducer R = 〈A × A,Q, q0,∆,Γ〉, where ∆ : Q × A × A → Q is a partial function. We
assume that for each state q ∈ Q and i ∈ {1, 2}, there is a set of allowed actions for each player, given by
λR : Q × {1, 2} → 2A \ {∅}. For each a1 ∈ λR(q, 1) and a2 ∈ λR(q, 2) we require that ∆(q, a1, a2) is
defined. Recall that Γ : Q→ {1, 2}.
We say that a concurrent game G = 〈A, V, λ, δ〉with objective α isR-concurrent if (1) the set of vertices
V are partitioned into configuration vertices C and intermediate vertices I , (2) intermediate vertices do not
contribute to the objective, thus for two plays pi and pi′ that differ only in their intermediate vertices, we have
pi ∈ α iff pi′ ∈ α, (3) the neighbors of configuration vertices are intermediate vertices and the transition
function restricted to configuration vertices is one-to-one, i.e., for every configuration vertex c and two pairs
of actions 〈a1, a2〉 6= 〈a′1, a′2〉, we have δ(c, a1, a2) 6= δ(c, a′1, a′2), (4) each intermediate vertex is controlled
by one player and its neighbors can either be all intermediate or all configuration vertices, (5) for v, v′ ∈ V
such that N(v), N(v′) ⊆ I , we have N(v) ∩ N(v′) = ∅, (6) each vertex in V is associated with a state in
R with the following restrictions. Suppose c ∈ C is associated with q ∈ Q. Then, λ(v, i) = λR(q, i), for
i ∈ {1, 2}. The transducer updates its state after concurrent moves in configuration vertices; namely, for
a configuration vertex c and two actions a1, a2 ∈ A, let u = δ(c, a1, a2) be an intermediate vertex. Then,
the state that is associated with u is q′ = ∆(q, a1, a2) and u is controlled by Player Γ(q′). The transducer
also updates its state between intermediate states; namely, if u′ ∈ I is a neighbor of u and assume Player 1
controls u and chooses action a1 to proceed from u to u′, then u′ is associated with ∆(q′, a1, a2), for all
a2 ∈ A, and similarly for Player 2. Finally, the transducer does not update its state when proceeding from
an intermediate vertex to a configuration one; namely, if c′ ∈ C is a neighbor of u ∈ I and u is associated
with q ∈ Q, then c′ is associated with q.
Each bidding game with transducer- and advantage-based tie-breaking is R-concurrent. Indeed, sup-
pose the sum of budgets is N ∈ IN in the bidding game. Then, the states of the transducer model the
players’ budget and the state of the tie-breaking mechanism. Thus, each state of the transducer is a triple
〈B1, B2, s〉 such that B1 + B2 = N . The set of allowed actions in a state 〈B1, B2, s〉 are the allowed bids,
thus λR(〈B1, B2, s〉, i) = {0, . . . , Bi}, for i ∈ {1, 2}. Following a bidding in a configuration vertex, the
intermediate vertex is obtained similarly to bidding games; namely, the budgets are updated by reducing the
winning bid from the winner’s budget and adding it to the loser’s budget, and the state of the tie-breaking
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mechanism is updated. With transducer-based tie-breaking, we need only one intermediate vertex between
two configuration vertices since we use the information from the bidding to update the state of the tie-
breaking transducer. In advantage-based tie-breaking, when no tie occurs, a single intermediate vertex is
needed since there is no update to the state of the tie-breaking mechanism. In case of a tie, however, a
second intermediate vertex is needed in order to allow the player who holds the advantage, the chance to
decide whether or not to use it.
We describe the intuition for local determinacy. Consider a concurrent game G and a vertex v. Recall
that it is generally not the case that G is determined. That is, it is possible that neither Player 1 nor Player 2
have a winning strategy from v. Suppose Player 1 has no winning strategy. We say that a transducer admits
local determinacy if in every vertex v that is not winning for Player 1, there is a Player 2 action that he can
reveal before Player 1 and stay in a non-losing vertex. Formally, we have the following.
Definition 5. Local determinacy. We say that a transducer R admits local determinacy if every concurrent
game G with Borel objective that is R-concurrent has the following property. Consider the turn-based game
G1 in which Player 1 reveals his action first in each position. Since α is Borel, it is a determined game and
there is a partition of the vertices to losing and winning vertices for Player 1. Then, for every vertex v ∈ V
that is losing for Player 1 in G1, there is a Player 2 action a2 such that, for every Player 1 action a1, the
vertex δ(v, a1, a2) is losing for Player 1 in G1.
We show that locally-determined games are determined by starting with reachability objectives and
working our way up to Müller objectives.
Lemma 6. If a reachability game G is R-concurrent for a locally-determined transducer R, then G is
determined.
Proof. Consider a concurrent reachability game G = 〈A, V, λ, δ, α〉 and a vertex v ∈ V from which Player 1
does not have a winning strategy. That is, v is losing for Player 1 in G1. We describe a winning strategy for
Player 2 from v in G. Player 2’s strategy maintains the invariant that the set of vertices S that are visited
along the play in G, are losing for Player 1 in G1. Recall that since we assume intermediate vertices do
not contribute to the objective, the target of Player 1 is a configuration vertex. The invariant implies that
Player 2 wins since there is no intersection between S and Player 1’s target, and thus the target is never
reached. Initially, the invariant holds by the assumption that v is losing for Player 1 in G1. Suppose the
token is placed on a vertex u in G. Local determinacy implies that Player 2 can choose an action a2 that
guarantees that no matter how Player 1 chooses, the game reaches a losing vertex for Player 1 in G1. Thus,
the invariant is maintained, and we are done.
Next, we show determinacy in parity games by reducing them to reachability games.
Lemma 7. If a parity game P isR-concurrent for a locally-determined transducerR, then P is determined.
Proof. Consider a parity game P = 〈A, V, δ, λ, p〉 that is R-concurrent, where R is locally determined.
Consider a vertex v ∈ V . Suppose that Player 1 does not win from v in P , and we prove that Player 2 wins
from v in P . We use a well-known reduction from parity games to reachability games (see for example,
[3]). By definition, for i ∈ {1, 2}, Player i does not win from v in the turn-based game Pi in which Player 1
reveals his bid first. The cycle-forming game that is associated with Pi and v, denoted CFG(Pi, v), is a
reachability game in which we intuitively play from v in Pi until a cycle is formed. The resulting play is a
lasso pi1pi2 and Player i wins iff his objective is met in the infinite play pi1piω2 . Memoryless determinacy of
turn-based parity games [21] implies that Player i wins from v in Pi iff he wins from v in CFG(Pi, v).
Formally, a vertex in CFG(Pi, v) records the history of the game in Pi. Recall that in a configuration
vertex c ∈ V , Player i reveals his action first, and, assuming he chooses a ∈ A, the following vertex is
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〈c, a〉, and its successors are intermediate vertices. Since intermediate vertices are controlled by one of
the players, there is no need to add further intermediate vertices. Note that a cycle can only be closed in
configuration vertices. Indeed, recall that for v, v′ ∈ V , if N(v), N(v′) ⊆ I , then N(v) ∩ N(v′) = ∅.
A vertex of CFG(Pi, v) is a sequence in (C × (C × A) × I∗)∗ with no repetitions. Consider a vertex
u = c1, (c1, a1), d
1
1, . . . , d
1
n1 , c2, . . . , vk, where vk is in C ∪ (C ×A)∪ I . If there is an earlier configuration
vertex cj with vk = cj , then u is a leaf and the winner in it is the winner of the infinite loop as in the above.
Otherwise, the player who controls vk in Pi controls u and its neighbors are u · v′, where v′ is a neighbor of
vk in Pi.
We apply the same cycle-forming game reduction to the original game P starting from the vertex v.
The resulting game is a reachability game that is R-concurrent. Vertices in CFG(P, v) are now of the
form (C × I∗)∗. Consider a vertex u = c1, d11, . . . , d1n1 , c2, . . . , vk. Then, u is a configuration vertex in
CFG(P, v) iff vk is a configuration vertex, and the state in R that u is associated with is the same as vk.
If vk is a configuration vertex, then the allowed actions of the two players in u are the same as in vk. The
rest of the construction follows the same lines as the one above. By Lemma 6, the game CFG(P, v) is
determined, thus if Player 1 does not win from v in CFG(P, v), then Player 2 wins from v in CFG(P, v).
For i ∈ {1, 2}, we construct CFG(P, v)i by requiring Player i to reveal his choice before Player −i in
configuration vertices. Note that CFG(Pi, v) and CFG(P, v)i have a slight technical difference; namely,
vertices in CFG(P, v)i lack the intermediate vertices in C×A. Since the transition function in P is one-to-
one when restricted to configuration vertices, the vertex between cj and d
j
i can be uniquely deduced. Thus,
Player i wins from v in CFG(Pi, v) iff Player i wins from v in CFG(P, v)i.
We combine the reductions: If Player 1 does not win from v in P , by definition, he loses from v in P1,
thus due to memoryless determinacy in turn-based games, he also loses from v in CFG(P1, v) and, due to
the equivalence between the games, also in CFG(P, v)1. Determinacy for reachability games implies that
Player 2 wins from v in CFG(P, v)2, and going in the other direction, we obtain that Player 2 wins from v
in P , and we are done.
The proof for Müller objectives is similar only that we replace the cycle-forming game reduction with a
reduction from Müller games to parity games [23, Chapter 2].
Theorem 8. If a Müller game G is R-concurrent for a locally-determined transducer R, then G is deter-
mined.
3.3 The bidding matrix
Consider a bidding game G = 〈V,E,N,M, α〉. Recall that G isR-concurrent, where a configuration vertex
is of the form c = 〈v,B1, B2, s〉. The set of allowed actions in c for Player i is {0, . . . , Bi}, for i ∈ {1, 2}.
In particular, there is a natural order on the actions. We think of the possible pairs of actions available in
c as a matrix Mc, which we call the bidding matrix. Rows in Mc correspond to Player 1 bids and columns
corresponds to Player 2 bids. The diagonal that starts in the top-left corner of Mc and follows entries of
the form 〈j, j〉, for 0 ≤ j ≤ min{B1, B2}, corresponds to biddings that resolve in a tie. Entries above
and below it correspond to biddings that are winning for Player 2 and Player 1, respectively. Consider the
turn-based game G1 in which Player 1 reveals his bid first. We consider objectives for which turn-based
games are determined, thus in G1, the vertex 〈c, b1, b2〉 is either winning for Player 1 or Player 2. The entries
in Mc are in {1, 2}, where Mc(b1, b2) = 1 iff the intermediate vertex 〈c, b1, b2〉 is winning for Player 1 in
G1.
For i ∈ {1, 2}, we call a row or column in Mc an i-row or i-column, respectively, if all its entries are i.
We rephrase local determinacy in bidding games in terms of the bidding matrix.
Definition 9. Consider a bidding game G = 〈V,E,N,M, α〉. We say that G is locally determined if for
every configuration vertex c, the bidding matrix either has a 2-column or a 1-row.
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It is not hard to show that Definition 9 implies Definition 5. Consider a bidding game G in which in each
configuration vertex c there is either a 1-row or a 2-column in Mc. We claim that G is locally determined.
Suppose c is losing for Player 1 in G1, we need to show that there is a Player 2 action (bid) that he can reveal
before Player 1 and that guarantees that the game stays in a losing vertex for Player 1. In other words, we
need to show that a 2-column exists. We rule out the possibility of a 1-row in Mc. This is immediate since
if there was a 1-row, Player 1 could use the corresponding bid, direct the game to a vertex from which he
wins, and use the winning strategy from there, contradicting the fact that c is losing for Player 1.
4 Transducer-based tie-breaking
The determinacy of bidding games with transducer-based tie-breaking depends on the information that is
available to the transducer. We start with a negative result.
Theorem 10. Reachability bidding games with alternate tie-breaking are not determined.
Proof. Consider the bidding reachability game that is depicted in Fig. 1. We show that no player has a
winning strategy when the game starts from the configuration 〈v0, 1, 1∗〉, thus the token is placed on v0,
both budgets equal 1, and Player 2 has the tie-breaking advantage. The proof that Player 2 has no winning
strategy is shown in Example 1. We show that Player 1 has no winning strategy, thus if he reveals his first
bid before Player 2, then Player 2 wins the game. In Fig. 3, we depict most of the relevant configurations in
the game with Player 2’s strategy in place. Consider the configuration 〈v0, 1, 1∗〉, and we assume Player 2
reveals his bid after Player 1. For example, if Player 1 bids 0, Player 2 bids 0, wins the bidding since he holds
the advantage, and the game proceeds to the configuration 〈v1, 1∗, 1〉. Similarly, if Player 1 bids 1, Player 2
bids 1, and the game proceeds to 〈v1, 2∗, 0〉. For readability, we omit from the figure some configurations
so some configuration have no outgoing edges. It is not hard to show that Player 2 can force the game from
these configurations back to one of the depicted configurations. Thus, when Player 1 reveals his bids first,
Player 2 can win by forcing the game away from t.
v1, 1
∗
, 1 v2, 1, 1
∗
0, 0
0, 0
v1, 2
∗
, 0 v2, 2, 0
∗
0, 0
0, 0
v1, 0
∗
, 2 v2, 0, 2
∗
0, 0
0, 0
v0, 1, 1
∗
0, 0
1, 1
1, 0
v0, 0, 2
∗
0, 0
1, 0
v2, 1
∗
, 1
1, 0
Figure 3: Configurations in the game that is depicted in Fig. 1.
We proceed to prove our positive results, namely that bidding games are determined when the informa-
tion according to which tie-breaking is determined does not include the occurrence of ties. Formally, we
define a subclass of tie-breaking transducers.
Definition 11. A transducer is un-aware of ties when its alphabet is V ×{1, 2}×IN, where a letter 〈v, i, b〉 ∈
V × {1, 2} × IN means that the token is placed on v and Player i wins the bidding with his bid of b.
We start with the following lemma that applies to any tie-breaking mechanism. Recall that rows repre-
sent Player 1 bids, columns represent Player 2 bids, entries on the top-left to bottom-right diagonal represent
ties in the bidding, entries above it represent Player 2 wins, and entries below represent Player 1 wins.
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Lemma 12. Consider a bidding game G with some tie-breaking mechanism T and consider a configuration
c = 〈v,B1, B2, s〉. Entries in Mc in a column above the diagonal are all equal, thus for bids b2 > b1, b′1,
the entries 〈b1, b2〉 and 〈b′1, b2〉 in Mc are equal. Also, the entries in a row to the left of the diagonal are
equal, thus for bids b1 > b2, b′2, the entries 〈b1, b2〉 and 〈b1, b′2〉 in Mc are equal.
Proof. Suppose Player 2 bids b2. For b1, b′1 < b2, no matter whether Player 1 bids b1 or b′1, Player 2’s budget
is decreases by b2, thus both the intermediate states 〈c, b1, b2〉 and 〈c, b1, b′2〉 are owned by Player 2 and have
the same neighbors. It follows that 〈c, b1, b2〉 is winning for Player 2 iff 〈c, b′1, b2〉 is winning for Player 2.
The other part of the lemma is dual.
The next lemma relates an entry on the diagonal with its neighbors.
Lemma 13. Consider a bidding game G, where tie-breaking is resolved according to a transducer T that is
un-aware of ties. Consider a configuration c = 〈v,B1, B2, s〉. Let b ∈ IN. If Γ(s) = 1, i.e., Player 1 wins
ties in c, then the entries 〈b, b〉 and 〈b, b − 1〉 in Mc are equal. Dually, if Γ(s) = 2, then the entries 〈b, b〉
and 〈b− 1, b〉 in Mc are equal.
Proof. We prove for Γ(s) = 1, and the other case is dual. Let c = 〈v,B1, B2, s〉. Note that the neighbors of
the intermediate vertices 〈c, b, b〉 and 〈c, b, b− 1〉 are the same. Indeed, Player 1 is the winner of the bidding
in both case, and so his budget decreases by b. Also, the update to the state s in T is the same in both cases
since T is un-aware of ties. It follows that 〈c, b, b〉 is winning for Player 1 iff 〈c, b, b − 1〉 is winning for
Player 1.
We continue to prove our positive results.
Theorem 14. Consider a tie-breaking transducer T that is un-aware of ties. Then, a Müller bidding game
that resolves ties using T is determined.
Proof. We show that transducers that are not aware of ties admit local determinacy, and the theorem follows
from Theorem 8. See a depiction of the proof in Figure 4.
Consider a bidding game 〈V,E, α,N, T 〉, where T is un-aware of ties, and consider a configuration
vertex c = 〈v,B1, B2, s〉. We show that Mc either has a 1-row or a 2-column. We prove for Γ(s) = 1 and
the proof for Γ(s) = 2 is similar. Let B = min{B1, B2}. When B2 > B1, the matrix Mc is a rectangle.
Still the diagonal of interest models biddings that result in ties and it starts from the top right corner of
Mc. The columns B + 1, . . . , B2 do not intersect this diagonal. By Lemma 12, the entries in each one of
these columns are all equal. We assume all the entries are 1 as otherwise we find a 2-column. Similarly, if
B1 > B2, we assume that the entries in the rows B + 1, . . . , B1 below the diagonal are all 2, otherwise we
find a 1-row.
We restrict attention to the B × B top-left sub-matrix of Mc. Consider the B-th row in Mc. By
Lemma 12, entries in this row that are below the diagonal are all equal, and, since Γ(s) = 1, they also
equal the entry on the diagonal. If all entries equal 1, then together with the assumption above that entries to
the right of the diagonal are all 1, we find a 1-row. Thus, we assume all entries below and on the diagonal in
the B-th row all equal 2. Now, consider the B-th column. By Lemma 12, the entries above the diagonal are
all equal. If they all equal 2, together with the entry 〈B,B〉 on the diagonal and the entries below it, which
we assume are all 2, we find a 2-column. Thus, we assume the entries in theB-th column above the diagonal
are all 1. Next, consider the (B − 1)-row. Similarly, the elements on and to the left of the diagonal are all
equal, and if they equal 1, we find a 1-row, thus we assume they are all 2. We continue in a similar manner
until the entry 〈1, 1〉. If it is 1, we find a 1-column and if it is 2, we find a 2-row, and we are done.
We conclude this section by relating the computational complexity of bidding games with turn-based
games. Let TBα be the class of turn-based games with a qualitative objective α. Let BIDα,trans be the
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class of bidding games with transducer-based tie-breaking and objective α. The problem TB-WINα gets a
game G ∈ TBα and a vertex v in G, and the goal is to decide whether Player 1 can win from v. Similarly,
the problem BID-WINα,trans gets as input a game G ∈ BIDα,trans with budgets expressed in unary and a
configuration c in G, and the goal is to decide whether Player 1 can win from c.
Theorem 15. For a qualitative objective α, the complexity of TB-WINα and BID-WINα,trans coincide.
Proof. In order to decide whether Player 1 wins in a configuration c in G ∈ BIDα,trans, we construct the
turn-based game G1 in which Player 1 reveals his bids before Player 2 and solve G1. The determinacy of G
implies that if Player 1 does not win G1, the Player 2 wins G2. The size of G1 is polynomial in G since the
budgets are given in unary.
The other direction is simple: given a turn-based game G, we set the total budgets to 0, thus all bids
result in ties. The tie-breaking transducer resolves ties by declaring the winner in a vertex v to be Player i if
he controls v in G. Clearly, the winner in G′ coincides with the winner in G.
5 Random-Based Tie Breaking
In this section we show that bidding games with random-based tie-breaking are determined. A stochastic
concurrent game is G = 〈A, V, λ, δ, α〉 is the same as a concurrent game only that the transition function is
stochastic, thus given v ∈ V and a1, a2 ∈ A, the transition function δ(v, a1, a2) is a probability distribution
over V . Two strategies σ1 and σ2 give rise to a probability distribution D(σ1, σ2) over infinite plays.
Traditionally, determinacy in stochastic concurrent games states that each vertex is associated with a
value, which is the probability that Player 1 wins under optimal play [27]. The value is obtained, however,
when the players are allowed to use probabilistic strategies. We show a stronger form of determinacy in bid-
ding games; namely, we show that the value exists even when the players are restricted to use deterministic
strategies.
Definition 16. Determinacy in stochastic games. Consider a stochastic concurrent game G and a ver-
tex v ∈ V . Let P1 and P2 denote the set of pure strategies for Players 1 and 2, respectively. For
i ∈ {1, 2}, the value for Player i, denoted vali(G, v), is intuitively obtained when he reveals his strategy
before the other player. We define val1(G, v) = supσ1∈P1 infσ2∈P2 Prpi∼D(σ1,σ2)[pi ∈ α] and val2(G, v) =
infσ2∈P2 supσ1∈P1 Prpi∼D(σ1,σ2)[pi ∈ α]. We say that G is determined in v if val1(G, v) = val2(G, v) in
which case we denote the value by val(G, v). We say that G is determined if it is determined in all ver-
tices.
The key idea in the proof shows determinacy for reachability games that are played on directed acyclic
graphs (DAGs, for short). The following lemma shows that the proof for DAGs implies the general case by
formalizing a standard “unwinding” argument (see for example Theorem 3.7 in [20]).
Lemma 17. Determinacy of reachability bidding games that are played on DAGs implies determinacy of
general reachability bidding games.
Proof. Let G = 〈V,E,B1, B2, t〉 be a reachability bidding game with random-based tie breaking, and let
v ∈ V . For n ∈ IN, we construct the game Tn such that Player 1 wins in Tn iff he can win in G in at most
n rounds. More formally, the vertices of Tn are (V × {0, . . . , n}) ∪ {t1, t2} and the initial vertex is 〈v, 0〉.
For 0 ≤ j < n and u ∈ V \ {t}, the neighbors of a vertex 〈u, j〉 are of the form 〈u′, j + 1〉, where u′ is
a neighbor of u in G. For i ∈ {1, 2}, the vertex ti is a sink and it is winning for Player i. Recall that t
is the target of Player 1 in G. The only neighbor of a vertex of the form 〈t, j〉, for 1 ≤ j ≤ n, is t1. For
u ∈ V \ {t}, the only neighbor of a vertex 〈u, n〉 is t2. Note that Tn is played on a DAG.
The assumption of the lemma is that val(Tn, 〈v, 0〉) exists and is obtained using pure strategies. We
claim that limn→∞ val(Tn, 〈v, 0〉) = val1(G, v), and the claim that limn→∞ val(Tn, 〈v, 0〉) = val2(G, v) is
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dual. While Player 1 is required to win within n rounds in Tn, there is no such bound in G, thus the value for
Player 1 in Tn is a lower bound for Player 1’s value in v, thus we have limn→∞ val(Tn, 〈v, 0〉) ≤ val1(G, v).
On the other hand, let σ1 be a Player 1 strategy in G. Player 1 can use σ1 in each Tn and thus the value w.r.t.
σ1 is a lower bound on the value of Tn. Tending n to infinity, the value of Tn w.r.t. σ1 tends to the value of
G w.r.t. σ1. Thus, we have limn→∞ val(Tn, 〈v, 0〉) ≥ val1(G, v).
We continue to show determinacy in bidding games on DAGs.
Lemma 18. Reachability bidding games with random-based tie-breaking that are played on DAGs are
determined.
Proof. Consider a reachability game G that is played on a DAG with two distinguished vertices t1 and t2,
which are sinks. There are no other cycles in G, thus all plays end either in t1 or t2, and, for i ∈ {1, 2},
Player i wins iff the game ends in ti. The height of G is the length of the longest path from some vertex to
either t1 or t2. We prove that G is determined by induction on its height. For a height of 0, the claim clearly
holds since for every B1, B2 ∈ IN, the value in t1 is 1 and the value in t2 is 0. Suppose the claim holds for
games of heights of at most n− 1 and we prove for games of height n.
Consider a configuration vertex c = 〈v,B1, B2〉 of height n. Let c′ be a configuration vertex that,
skipping intermediate vertices, is a neighbor of c. Then, the height of c′ is less than n and by the induction
hypothesis, its value is well defined. It follows that the value of the intermediate vertices following c are
also well-defined: if the intermediate vertex is controlled by Player 1 or Player 2, the value is respectively
the maximum or minimum of its neighbors, and if it is controlled by Nature, the value is the average of its
two neighbors.
We claim that G is determined in c by showing that one of the players has a (weakly) dominant bid
from c, where a bid b1 dominates a bid b′1 if, intuitively, Player 1 always prefers bidding b1 over b′1. It is
convenient to consider a variant of the bidding matrix Mc of c, which is a (B1 + 1)× (B2 + 1) matrix with
entries in [0, 1], where an entry Mc(b1, b2) represents the value of the intermediate vertex 〈c, b1, b2〉. Note
that Player 1, the reachability player, aims to maximize the value while Player 2 aims to minimize it. We
observe some properties of the entries in Mc (see Fig. 5).
• An entry on the diagonal is the average of two of its neighbors, namely Mc(b, b) = 12
(
Mc(b− 1, b) +
Mc(b, b− 1)
)
.
• As in Lemma 12, the entries in a column above the diagonal as well as entries in a row to the left of
the diagonal, are all equal.
• For b1 > b′1 > b2, we have Mc(b1, b2) ≤ Mc(b′1, b2), since Player 1 can use the same strategies from
〈c, b′1, b2〉 as from 〈c, b1, b2〉. Similarly, for b2 > b′2 > b1, we have Mc(b1, b2) ≥Mc(b1, b′2).
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We show that one of the players has a weakly dominant bid from c, where a bid b1 dominates a bid b′1
if for every bid b2 of Player 2, we have Mc(b1, b2) ≥ Mc(b′1, b2), and dually for Player 2. Consider the
bids 0 and 1 for the two players. We claim that there is a player for which either 0 weakly dominates 1 or
vice versa. Assume towards contradiction that this is not the case. Consider the 2× 2 top-left sub-matrix of
Mc and denote its values v0,0, v0,1, v1,0, and v1,1. Since v1,1 is the average of v0,1 and v1,0, we either have
v0,1 ≤ v1,1 ≤ v1,0 or v0,1 ≥ v1,1 ≥ v1,0. Suppose w.l.o.g. that the first holds, thus v0,1 ≤ v1,0. Note that
v0,0 < v0,1, since otherwise the bid 1 dominates 0 for Player 2. Also, we have v0,0 > v1,0, since otherwise
0 dominates 1 for Player 1. Combining, we have that v0,1 > v1,0, and we reach a contradiction.
Suppose Player 1 has a dominating row and the case of Player 2 is dual. To apply the inductive argument,
we show two properties: (1) if row 0 dominates row 1, then row 0 dominates every other row i, and (2) if
row 1 dominates row 0, then column 1 dominates column 0. Property (1) implies that if row 0 dominates
row 1, we find a pair of optimal strategies by setting Player 1’s bid to be 0 and Player 2’s bid to be a best
response to Player 1’s bid. Property (2) gives rise to a second inductive argument on the size of Mc; namely,
if row 1 dominates row 0, we can construct a restricted game with the same properties as the original game
by removing the first column and row from Mc. In the case that row 1 always dominates row 0, there are
two cases. If the players’ budgets are equal, we will end up with a matrix that consists of a unique entry.
If Player 1’s budget is larger than Player 2’s budget, then we end up with a sub-matrix M ′c that consists of
rows that do not intersect the main diagonal of Mc, thus the entries in a row i in M ′c are all equal and are
larger than those in row i+ 1. In both cases, one of the players has a weakly dominant strategy.
We conclude the proof by proving the two properties above. We start with Property (1). Assume row 0
dominates row 1. We show that, for i ≥ 1, row i dominates row i + 1. Recall that below the diagonal, for
every i ≥ 1 and j < i, we have vi,j ≥ vi+1,j , and above the diagonal, for j > i, we have vi,j = vi−1,j .
We are left with two claims to show; namely, that vi,i ≥ vi+1,i and vi,i+1 ≥ vi+1,i+1. Recall that below
the diagonal, for j < i − 1, we have vi,j = vi,j+1. Thus, proceeding down from v0,1 and then proceeding
right, we obtain v0,1 ≤ vi+1,i. Similarly, above the diagonal, by proceeding right from v0,1 and then down,
we obtain v0,1 ≤ vi,i+1. Since v1,1 = 12(v0,1 + v1,0) and we assume that v0,1 ≥ v1,1, we have v0,1 ≥ v1,0.
Combining the above with vi+1,i+1 = 12(vi,i+1 + vi+1,i), we obtain vi+1,i ≤ vi+1,i+1 ≤ vi,i+1. Observing
the previous entry on the diagonal, we note that the same proof shows that vi,i−1 ≤ vi,i ≤ vi−1,i. Thus, from
vi,i, we take one step left, one step down, and one step to the right and obtain vi,i ≥ vi,i−1 ≥ vi+1,i−1 =
vi+1,i, and we are done.
We proceed to prove Property (2). Assume row 1 dominates row 0. As in the above, we have v1,0 ≥ v1,1.
Below the diagonal, for every i ≥ 1, we have vi,0 = vi,1. Finally, there is no need to show that v0,0 ≥ v0,1
because Player 1 would never choose row 0 since it is dominated by row 1.
Combining the two theorems above, we obtain the following.
Theorem 19. Reachability bidding games with random-based tie breaking are determined.
6 Advantage-Based Tie-Breaking
Recall that in advantage-based tie-breaking, one of the players holds the advantage, and when a tie oc-
curs, he can choose whether to win and pass the advantage to the other player, or lose the bidding and
keep the advantage. Advantage-based tie-breaking was introduced and studied in [20], where determinacy
for reachability games was obtained by showing that each vertex v in the game has a threshold budget
Thresh(v) ∈ (IN × {∗}) such that that Player 1 wins from v iff his budget is at least Thresh(v),
where n∗ ∈ (IN × {∗}) means that Player 1 wins when he starts with a budget of n as well as the ad-
vantage. We show that advantage-based tie-breaking admits local determinacy, thus Müller bidding games
with advantage-based are determined.
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Figure 7: A depiction of Lemma 22.
Recall that the state of the advantage-based tie-breaking mechanism represents which player has the
advantage, thus it is in {1, 2}.
Lemma 20. [20] Consider a reachability bidding game G with advantage-based tie-breaking.
• Holding the advantage is advantageous: For i ∈ {1, 2}, if Player i wins from a configuration vertex
〈v,B1, B2,−i〉, then he also wins from 〈v,B1, B2, i〉.
• The advantage can be replaced by a unit of budget: Suppose Player 1 wins in 〈v,B1, B2, 1〉, then he
also wins in 〈v,B1 + 1, B2 − 1, 2〉. Suppose Player 2 wins in 〈v,B1, B2, 2〉, then he also wins in
〈v,B1 − 1, B2 + 1, 1〉.
We need two more observation on the bidding matrix, which are depicted in Figs. 6 and 7, stated in
Lemmas 21 and 22.
Lemma 21. Consider a reachability bidding game G with advantage-based tie-breaking. Consider a con-
figuration c = 〈v,B1, B2, 1〉 in G, where Player 1 has the advantage, and i ∈ {0, . . . , B1}. Then,
• If Mc(i− 1, i) = Mc(i, i− 1) = 2, then Mc(i, i) = 2.
• If Mc(i, i) = 2, then Mc(i+ 1, i) = 2.
Proof. We start with the first claim. Since both players bid i, a tie occurs. Since Player 1 holds the advantage,
there are two cases. In the first case, Player 1 calls himself the winner and proceeds to a configuration
〈v′, B1 − i, B2 + i, 2〉. We assume Player 2 wins from the vertex 〈c, i, i − 1〉, in which he loses the first
bidding. A possible choice of vertex for Player 1 is v′, thus Player 2 wins from the resulting configuration
〈v′, B1 − i, B2 + i, 1〉. By Lemma 20, Player 2 also wins 〈v′, B1 + i, B2 − i, 2〉. In the second case,
Player 1 calls Player 2 the winner. We assume Player 2 wins from the vertex 〈c, i − 1, i〉, in which he
wins the first bidding. Let v′ be the choice of vertex in a winning strategy, thus the resulting configuration
is 〈v′, B1 + i, B2 − i, 1〉, which is winning for Player 2 and is the resulting configuration when Player 2
chooses v′ following the tie.
For the second claim, we assume Player 2 wins 〈c, i, i〉, thus when a tie occurs. Since Player 1 has the
tie-breaking advantage, Player 2 wins in particular when Player 1 calls himself the winner, and the resulting
configuration is 〈v′, B1 − i, B2 + i, 2〉. We claim that Player 2 wins from 〈c, i + 1, i〉, thus Player 1 wins
the bidding. Let 〈v′, B1 − (i+ 1), B2 + (i+ 1), 1〉 be the resulting configuration, which by Lemma 20, is a
Player 2 winning vertex.
Lemma 22. Consider a reachability bidding game G with advantage-based tie-breaking. Consider a con-
figuration c = 〈v,B1, B2, 2〉 in G, where Player 2 has the advantage, and i ∈ {0, . . . , B2}. Then,
• If Mc(i− 1, i) = Mc(i, i− 1) = 1, then Mc(i, i) = 1.
• If Mc(i, i− 1) = 2, then Mc(i, i) = 2.
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Proof. We start with the first claim. Consider a configuration vertex c = 〈v,B1, B2, 2〉. Since Player 1
wins when the bids are i and i− 1, i.e., Player 1 wins the bidding, there is a configuration vertex 〈v′, B1 −
i, B2 + i, 2〉 from which Player 1 wins. Similarly, since Player 1 wins when the bids are i − 1 and i,
he wins no matter which vertex v′′ Player 2 chooses to move to, i.e., from configurations of the form
〈v′′, B1 + i, B2 − i, 2〉. Consider the case that both players bid i. Player 2 has the tie-breaking advantage,
thus there are two cases to consider. First, Player 2 calls himself the winner and chooses the next vertex, thus
the proceeding configuration is of the form 〈v′′, B1 + i, B2 − i, 1〉. Combining the above with Lemma 20,
Player 1 wins. Second, Player 2 calls Player 1 the winner of the bidding. Player 1 then chooses v′ as in the
above, and the following configuration is 〈v′B1 − i, B2 + i, 2〉, from which Player 1 wins.
We continue to the second part of the lemma. Since Player 2 has the tie-breaking advantage, he calls
Player 1 the winner when both players bid i. Let c′ = 〈v′, B1 − i, B2 + i, 1〉 be the resulting configuration.
Since we assume Player 2 wins from 〈c, i, i − 1〉, i.e., when Player 1 wins the bidding, Player 2 wins from
a configuration 〈v′, B1 − i, B2 + i, 2〉 that results from a Player 1 choice of vertex. By Lemma 20, Player 2
also wins from c′.
We are ready to prove determinacy.
Theorem 23. Müller bidding games with advantage-based tie-breaking are determined.
Proof. Consider a bidding game G with advantage-based tie-breaking and a configuration c = 〈v,B1, B2, s〉
in G. It is not hard to apply Lemma 12 to the deterministic case. It follows that there is a row x1 ≤ B1
such that Mc(y1, y2) = 1 below the diagonal and above x1, i.e., x1 ≥ y1 and y1 > y2. Similarly, there is
a column x2 ≤ B1 such that Mc(y1, y2) = 1 above the diagonal and to the left of x2, i.e., x2 ≤ y2 and
y2 > y1.
We distinguish between two cases. In the first case, Player 2 has the advantage in c. Suppose x2 ≤ x1
and consider the row x1. By the definition of x1 and x2, the entries in the row to the left and to the right of
the diagonal are all 1. In addition, since x2 ≤ x1, the entries in the column x1 above the diagonal are also
1. Thus, by Lemma 22, we have Mc(x1, x1) = 1 and we find a 1-row. On the other hand, suppose x2 > x1
and observe the column x1. By the definition of x1 and x2 the entries above and below the diagonal are all
2 and by Lemma 22, the diagonal is also 2.
Suppose Player 1 has the advantage. Suppose x2 > x1 + 1 and consider the (x1 + 1) column. By the
definition of x1 and x2, the entries below and above the diagonal are 2. Since the entries in the row (x1 + 1)
to the left of the diagonal are 2, by Lemma 21, the diagonal is also 2, thus the (x1+1)-column is a 2-column.
If x2 = x1 + 1, we observe the (x + 1) element on the diagonal. If it is 1, the x1-row is a 1-row, and if it
is 2, then the x1-column is a 2-column. Finally, suppose x1 ≥ x2. Since we have Mc(x1, x1 − 1) = 1, i.e.,
the element immediately to the left of the diagonal in the x1 row, the contrapositive of Lemma 21 implies
that Mc(x1 − 1, x1 − 1) = 1. Thus, the (x1 − 1)-row is a 1-row, and we are done.
We turn to study computational complexity of bidding games. Let BIDα,adv be the class of bidding
games with advantage-based tie-breaking and objective α, and let BID-WINα,adv be the respective decision
problem. Recall that TB-WINα is the decision problem for turn-based games.
Theorem 24. For a qualitative objective α, the complexity of TB-WINα and BID-WINα,adv coincide.
Proof. The direction from BID-WINα,adv to TB-WINα follows from determinacy as in Theorem 15. For
the other direction, consider a turn-based game G and an initial vertex v0. We assume w.l.o.g. that players
alternate turns in G. That is, the neighbors of a Player i vertex v in G are controlled by Player −i. We
construct a bidding game G′ in which the total budgets is 0. We introduce to G two new sink vertices t1 and
t2, where a play that ends in ti is winning for Player i, for i ∈ {1, 2}. For a Player i vertex v in G, we add
an edge from v to t−i, thus if Player i has the advantage in v, he must use it. Suppose v0 is a Player 1 vertex
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v1 v2 v3
Figure 8: A strongly-connected Büchi game in which Player 1 loses with every initial budget.
in G. It is not hard to show that Player 1 wins from v0 in G′ when he has the advantage iff he wins from v0
in G.
7 Strongly-Connected Games
Reasoning about strongly-connected games is key to the solution in continuous-bidding infinite-duration
games [7, 8, 10]. It is shown that in a strongly-connected continuous-bidding game, with every initial
positive budget, a player can force the game to visit every vertex infinitely often. It follows that in a strongly-
connected Büchi game G with at least one accepting state, Player 1 wins with every positive initial budget.
We show a similar result in discrete-bidding games in two cases.
Theorem 25. Consider a strongly-connected bidding game G in which tie-breaking is either resolved ran-
domly or by a transducer that always prefers Player 1. Then, for every pair of initial budgets, Player 1 can
force visiting every vertex in G infinitely often with probability 1.
Proof. Suppose Player 1 moves whenever a tie occurs and let v be a vertex in the game. Player 1 follows
a strategy in which he always bids 0 and moves to a vertex that is closer to v. For every initial budget of
Player 2, he wins only a finite number of times. Consider the outcome following the last time Player 2 wins.
Since Player 1 wins all biddings, in each turn the token moves one step closer to v, and thus we visit v every
|V | turns, in the worst case. Similarly, when tie-breaking is resolved randomly, the game following the last
win of Player 2 is an ergodic Markov chain in which it is well-known that every vertex is visited infinitely
often with probability 1.
In [20], it is roughly stated that, with advantage-based tie-breaking, as the budgets tend to infinity, the
game “behaves” similarly to a continuous-bidding game. We show that infinite-duration discrete-bidding
games can be quite different from their continuous counterparts; namely, we show a Büchi game G such that
under continuous-bidding, Player 1 wins in G with every pair of initial budgets, and under discrete-bidding,
Player 1 loses in G with every pair of initial budgets.
Theorem 26. There is a strongly-connected Büchi discrete-bidding game with advantage-based tie-breaking
such that Player 1 loses with every pair of initial budgets.
Proof. Suppose the game that is depicted in Fig. 8 starts at vertex v1 with initial budgets B1 ∈ IN and
B2 = 0. Player 2 always bids 0, uses the advantage when he has it, and, upon winning, stays in v1 and
moves from v2 to v1. Note that in order to visit v3, Player 1 needs to win two biddings in a row; in v1 and
v2. Thus, in order to visit v3, he must “invest” a unit of budget, meaning that the number of visits to v3 is
bounded by B1.
8 Discussion and Future Work
We study discrete-bidding infinite-duration bidding games and identify large fragments of bidding games
that are determined. Bidding games are a subclass of concurrent games. We are not aware of other sub-
classes of concurrent games that admit determinacy. We find it an interesting future direction to extend
the determinacy we show here beyond bidding games. Weaker versions of determinacy in fragments of
concurrent games have been previously studied [37].
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We focused on bidding games with “Richman” bidding and it is interesting to study other bidding games
with other bidding rules. Discrete-bidding has previously been studied in combination with all-pay bidding
[30] in which both players pay their bid to the other player. In addition, it is interesting to study discrete-
bidding games with quantitative objectives and non-zero-sum games, which were previously studied only
for continuous bidding [7, 8, 29].
This work belongs to a line of works that transfer concepts and ideas between the areas of formal
verification and algorithmic game theory [33]. Examples of works in the intersection of the two fields include
logics for specifying multi-agent systems [2, 17, 31], studies of equilibria in games related to synthesis and
repair problems [16, 14, 22, 1], non-zero-sum games in formal verification [18, 13], and applying concepts
from formal methods to resource allocation games such as rich specifications [11], efficient reasoning about
very large games [6, 24], and a dynamic selection of resources [9].
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